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Abstract— Key management is a core mechanism to ensure the
security of applications and network services in wireless sensor
networks. Key management includes two aspects: key distribution
and key revocation. The goal of the key distribution is to establish
the required keys between sensor nodes which must exchange
data. Key revocation is used to remove compromised sensor nodes
from the network. Although many key distribution schemes and
key revocation schemes have been proposed in the literature,
there is a lack of a framework which can integrate the schemes. In
this paper, we propose a key management framework, uKeying,
for wireless sensor networks using a globally distributed session
key. uKeying includes three parts: a security mechanism to
provide secrecy for the communication in the sensor network, an
efficient session key distribution scheme, and a centralized key
revocation scheme. The proposed framework does not depend
on a specific key distribution scheme and can support many key
distribution schemes. We further demonstrate how to use the
framework to support secure group communication protocols in
wireless sensor networks. Our analysis shows that the framework
is secure, efficient, and extensible. The simulation and results
reveal for the first time that a centralized key revocation scheme
can also attain a high efficiency.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are promising solutions
for many applications and security is an essential requirement
of WSNs. Among all security issues in WSNs, key management is a core mechanism to ensure the security of applications
and network services in WSNs [1].
The goal of key management is to establish the required
keys between sensor nodes which must exchange data. A key
management scheme includes two aspects: key distribution and
key revocation. Key distribution refers to the task of distributing secret keys to sensor nodes to provide communication
secrecy and authentication. Key revocation refers to the task of
securely removing keys which are known to be compromised.
Many key distribution schemes [2], [3], [4] and key revocation schemes [5], [6] have been proposed for sensor networks.
The details of the schemes vary considerably [1]. For example,
these schemes are designed based on techniques such as
combinatorial theory [7], [8] and random graph theory [2], [9];
these schemes require sensor nodes to be loaded with different
key materials, such as a master key shared by all nodes [10],
or a random key pool equipped with each sensor node [2],

[9]; they also use different keys for secure communication,
for example, pairwise keys, path keys [2], or cluster keys [10].
Although many key management schemes have been proposed in the literature, there is a lack of a framework which
can integrate the schemes. In this paper, we propose a unified
key management framework, uKeying, for wireless sensor
networks. The proposed framework does not depend on a specific key distribution scheme and can support many different
schemes. Further, it is also easy to extend the framework to
support other secure applications, for example, secure group
communication (SGC), in wireless sensor networks.
uKeying includes three parts: a security mechanisms to
provide confidentiality, authentication, and integrity for the
communication in the network, an efficient session key distribution scheme, and a centralized key revocation scheme
to remove compromised sensor nodes from the network. The
security of the communication is ensured by two types of keys:
encryption key, and message authentication code (MAC) key.
Both of the two keys are bound to a globally distributed session
key. The session key can be distributed in the network using
a broadcasting message in one round.
Our contributions in this paper include the following:
1) We propose a unified key management framework for
wireless sensor networks which can be used to integrate
different key distribution schemes.
2) We analyze and evaluate the performance of four key
revocation schemes in wireless sensor networks. We
reveal that our centralized key revocation scheme can
also attain a high efficiency in wireless sensor networks.
3) We further demonstrate how to use the framework
to support secure group communication schemes in a
WSN.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses the related work. Section III introduces our
proposed key management framework. The security and performance analyses are presented in Section IV, and followed
by the simulation experiments and results in Section V. Section
VI concludes the paper.

II. R ELATED WORK
As discussed earlier, key management includes two aspects:
key distribution and key revocation. Many key distribution
schemes have been proposed in sensor networks. According
to the network structure, the schemes can be divided into
centralized key distribution schemes [3] and distributed key
distribution schemes [2], [4]. According to the probability of
key sharing between a pair of sensor nodes, the key distribution
schemes can be classified into deterministic approaches [10],
[7] and probabilistic approaches [2], [4]. An investigation of
key distribution schemes for WSNs can be found in [1].
In this paper, we propose a unified key management framework, uKeying, for wireless sensor networks. uKeying does
not depend on a specific key distribution scheme as long
as the key distribution scheme provides pairwise keys for
sensor nodes which must exchange data. The establishment
of the pairwise keys among sensor nodes is one of the main
tasks for a key distribution scheme and has been extensively
studied in the literature. For example, the key distribution
scheme in [2] consists of three phases: key pre-distribution,
shared-key discovery, and path key establishment. In the key
pre-distribution phase, each sensor is equipped with a key
ring held in the memory. The key ring consists of k keys
which are randomly drawn from a large pool of P keys. In
the shared key discovery phase, each sensor discovers its
neighbors within wireless communication range with which
it shares keys. Finally, in the path-key establishment phase, a
path-key is assigned between sensor nodes which are within
wireless communication range but do not share a key at the
end of the second phase.
Key revocation refers to the task of securely removing keys
which are known to be compromised. To detect a compromised
sensor, intrusion detection techniques are employed. Intrusion
detection is out of the scope of this paper. We assume that
there are some methods [11], [12], [13] using a base station
which can detect a compromised sensor node. Recent work
conducted on key revocation for WSNs include [2], [9], [6],
[5], [14]. These key revocation schemes can be divided into
two categories: the centralized key revocation schemes, such as
EsRev scheme [2], GPSRRev scheme [14], and the distributed
key revocation schemes, DistRev scheme [9], [6].
Although a few schemes [2], [6] have been proposed to
address the key revocation problem in WSNs, these schemes
incur various difficulties when used in sensor networks.
For example, the EsRev scheme proposed in [2] requires
a signature key to be distributed to the non-revoked sensor
nodes. However, the signature key can only be distributed
by unicasting which causes severe performance issues in
large scale sensor networks. In GPSRRev scheme [14], the
revocation area is divided into sub-areas. For each sub-area, a
revocation message is sent to a certain node within that area
using GPSR protocol [15], and then the revocation message
is multicasted to the remaining sub-area. However, additional
information, such as location of the sensor nodes, must be
used. Further, the multicast of the revocation message in the

sub-area is implemented using message flooding and it is still
time and energy consuming. The distributed key revocation
scheme, DistRev, proposed in [6] are based on some simple
assumptions such as each node knowing its neighboring nodes
before the sensor network is deployed.
In [5], we proposed a centralized key revocation scheme,
KeyRev, for wireless sensor networks. In this paper, the
KeyRev scheme is also integrated in our framework and we
further analyze, evaluate and compare the performance of the
KeyRev scheme with that of the other three key revocation
schemes.
Secure group communication is an important application in
event-based wireless sensor networks [16]. The obvious benefit
of secure group communication to WSNs is that outside nodes
are unable to obtain any messages transmitted to the group.
Secure group communication is also attractive for in-network
processing and data aggregation [17]. In [16], we proposed
two SGC schemes (SGC-unicasting and SGC-broadcasting)
for wireless sensor networks based on using any sensor node
member as a group controller. In this paper, we further present
two new secure group communication schemes for WSNs (the
SGC-overlapping and the SGC-preloading schemes) using the
proposed key management framework.
III. U K EYING : A U NIFIED K EY M ANAGEMENT
F RAMEWORK FOR WSN S
A. A security mechanism to provide secrecy
The lifetime of a WSN is partitioned into time intervals
called sessions. The duration of sessions can be fixed or
dynamic depending on the applications. The base station is responsible for distributing session keys to the sensor nodes. We
use Kj to denote the j-th session key where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}
and m is the number of sessions. We assume that each sensor
is uniquely identified by an ID number i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and n is the largest ID number.
We use two kinds of keys for secure communication in the
sensor network: the encryption key, Kencr and the message
authentication code (MAC) key, Kmac . For any message
transmitted in the network, authentication, confidentiality, and
integration are required. Let A and B be two entities in a
WSN, the complete message A sends to B is:
A −→ B : E(Kencr , M ||Ts ), M AC(Kmac , {M ||Ts }Kencr )
where M is the message, Ts is the timestamp when sending
the message, E(K, R) denotes the encryption of the message
R with key K, and M AC(K, R) denotes the computation of
the message authentication code of message R with key K.
Let Kj be the current session key and KA,B represent the
pairwise key shared between the entity A and the entity B.
The encryption key and the MAC key used in session j can
be generated as follows:
Kencr = F (M AC(KA,B , Kj ), 1)
Kmac = F (M AC(KA,B , Kj ), 2)
where F (K, x) is a pseudo-random function and x is an
integer 1 or 2 for generating Kencr or Kmac respectively.

The security of the communication between A and B is
ensured by the encryption key, Kencr and the MAC key, Kmac .
Any message that A sends to B is encrypted by the encryption
key Kencr and signed by the MAC key Kmac . For any message that B receives from A, B always verifies the message
first and then decrypts it. Further, a sensor node always uses
the encryption key and the MAC key corresponding to the
current session key to encrypt and sign the outgoing messages
or decrypt and verify the incoming messages.
The pairwise key between A and B does not depend on a
specific key distribution scheme and thus, the framework can
be extended for implementation with other key distribution
schemes. Next, we introduce our session key distribution
scheme.
B. Session key distribution
The session key distribution is based on the personal key
share distribution scheme in [18]. It can be divided into three
phases, viz., setup, broadcast, and session key recovery.
1) Setup: The setup server randomly picks m 2t-degree
masking polynomials, hj (x) = hj,0 + hj,1 x + · · · +
hj,2t x2t , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, over a finite field Fq where
q is a sufficiently large prime number. For each sensor
node Ai , the setup server loads the personal secrets,
{h1 (i), h2 (i), · · · , hm (i)}, on to the node A. The setup
server also loads the polynomial, hj (x), on to the base
station. For each session key Kj , the setup server randomly picks a t-degree polynomial pj (x) and constructs
qj (x) = Kj − pj (x).
2) Broadcast: Given a set of revoked sensor nodes, R =
{r1 , r2 , · · · , rw }, w ≤ t in session j, the base station
distributes the shares of t-degree polynomial pj (x) and
qj (x) to non-revoked sensors via the following broadcast
message:
B

= {R}
∪ {Pj (x) = gj (x)pj (x) + hj (x)}
∪ {Qj (x) = gj (x)qj (x) + hj (x)}

(1)

where the revocation polynomial gj (x) is constructed
as gj (x) = (x − r1 )(x − r2 ) · · · (x − rw ). The authenticity of the broadcast message is ensured by broadcast
authentication schemes such as µT esla [19].
3) Session key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at point i and gets Pj (i) =
gj (i)pj (i) + hj (i) and Qj (i) = gj (i)qj (i) + hj (i).
Because Ai knows hj (i) and gj (i) 6= 0, it can compute
Q (i)−h (i)
P (i)−h (i)
pj (i) = j gj (i)j and qj (i) = j gj (i)j . Ai can then
compute the new session key Kj = pj (i) + qj (i). The
revoked sensors cannot recover pj (i) and qj (i) because
gj (i) = 0 and thus they cannot compute the new session
key.
Since the communication among sensor nodes depends on
their processing the correct session key, the sensor network
must be synchronized to use the same session key.

C. Key revocation
We proposed an efficient key revocation scheme, KeyRev,
for wireless sensor networks and evaluated its performance
against other centralized key revocation schemes in [5]. The
KeyRev scheme can also be integrated in the proposed framework. We consider two situations here:
1) In case there are no compromised sensors in the network,
the base station selects a constant c, c ∈
/ {1, · · · , n}, and
add c to the revocation list such as R = {c}. Then,
the base station broadcasts the message as shown in
Equation 1.
2) In case a set of sensor nodes {r1 , r2 , · · · , rw } are compromised, the base station sets R = {r1 , r2 , · · · , rw } and
broadcasts the message as shown in Equation 1.
Without obtaining the new session key, the compromised
sensor cannot derive the encryption key, Kencr and the MAC
key, Kmac and thus cannot decrypt new messages and authenticate itself to other sensor nodes in the network. The
compromised sensor nodes can thus be removed from the
network.
D. Secure group communication
The proposed framework can also be used to facilitate
secure group communication using the unique session key.
The group key KG can be generated using a function
M AC(K, M ) over two secrets, a group key share Ks , and
a session key Kj :
KG = M AC(Kj , Ks )

(2)

The session key distribution has been described in Section
III-A. The group formation and the group key share distribution process are described below:
1) Solicit interest: The base station broadcasts a message
soliciting expression of interest in event E to the sensor
network:
B −→ ∗ : gid||E
The authentication of the broadcast message is ensured
by broadcast authentication schemes such as µT esla
[19]. No one can impersonate a base station and broadcast an authenticated message.
2) Join: All the receivers observing the same event E send
a Join Request to the base station:
A −→ B : IDA ||gid||E, M AC(KA,B , IDA ||gid||E)
where KA,B is the pairwise key shared by the sensor
node A with the base station B.
3) Group key share distribution: Once the base station
authenticates the join request, the base station unicasts
the group key share Ks to the sensor A using the Secret
Share message:
B −→ A : {Ks }KA,B
along the routing paths set up during the transmission
of the Interest and the Join Request messages (Please
refer to [16] for the details).

With the group key share Ks and the current session key
Kj , each group member can calculate the shared group key
KG as described in Equation 2.
The proposed scheme, which is referred to as SGCoverlapping scheme, is much simpler when a sensor node
wants to leave the group. The leave operation can be reduced
to the session key update problem and can be completed using
one broadcast message.
Notice that the group formation phase in the SGCoverlapping scheme may take a long time due to the use of
unicasting to distribute the group key share. If we know the
group membership during the pre-distribution stage, we can
load a group key share on to the sensor nodes before the
sensor network is deployed. Thus, the group formation phase
can be simplified as the distribution of the session key only.
The new scheme, SGC-preloading, is thus a specific instance
of the SGC-overlapping scheme.
Note that the solution of preloading a single mission key
on to the sensor nodes in the group does not work. Once
a sensor node is compromised, the single mission key is
exposed and cannot ensure the security of the group communication. However, in the SGC-preloading scheme, although
an adversary may compromise the sensor node to steal the
group key share, the adversary cannot participate in the group
communication until it obtains the session key. By preloading
a group key share in sensor nodes before the sensor network
is deployed, the SGC-preloading scheme greatly reduces the
group formation time. It requires only one broadcast message
to set up the group and update the group key.
IV. S ECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we first discuss the security of the framework.
Then, we analyze the computation, the communication costs,
and the storage requirements of the framework.
A. Security analysis
The proposed framework satisfies the following properties.
Property 1 The session key distribution process is secure.
Proof: The session key is distributed using the personal
key distribution scheme [18]. To restore the session key, it
is required that some personal secret be pre-distributed among
the sensor nodes. Outsiders cannot recover the session key
without the pre-distributed secret. Further, as we show in
Section III-A, the revoked sensors cannot recover the new
session keys either. Thus, the session key distribution process
is secure.
Property 2 The KeyRev scheme is secure inspite of the nonremoval of the pre-distributed key materials at a compromised
sensor node.
Proof: Although, due to the non-removal of the predistributed key materials, the compromised sensor may retain
the pairwise keys, the adversaries cannot figure out the encryption key, Kencr and the MAC key, Kmac if the session
key is updated. In the worst case, an adversary might use a
chosen plaintext attack to crack the session key; however, the
attack itself is also time consuming. As long as the duration

of sessions is less than the session key cracking time, the
proposed key revocation scheme is secure.
B. Performance analysis
1) Computation cost: To restore the session key, each
sensor node must evaluate the polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at
point i. The polynomial evaluation is fast and thus the session
key recovery is efficient in computation.
2) Communication cost: The performance of the framework depends mainly on the session key updating process. The
session key can be updated in one round using broadcasting.
The maximum size of the broadcast message in bits is decided
by S:
S = (5t + 2) log q
Let B indicate the transmission rate of the base station, L be
the maximum range between the base station and the sensor
nodes. The session key distribution time can be calculated as:
S
L
+
B
3 ∗ 108
Compared with the transmission time, the propagation delay is
very small. Thus, we can approximately estimate the session
key distribution time as:
ts =

(5t + 2) log q
B
3) Storage requirement: To restore the session key, each
sensor node needs to be loaded with m personal secrets. Since
the encryption key and the message authentication code key
can be set up on the fly, the extra storage needed to implement
the KeyRev scheme is m log q.
ts ≈

C. Comparison
1) KeyRev: The KeyRev scheme is a centralized key
revocation scheme. It depends on an efficient session key
distribution scheme which can be implemented in one round
using a broadcast message. In contrast, in case a sensor node is
compromised, the EsRev scheme requires two rounds of communications: distributing a signature key to the non-revoked
sensors, followed by broadcasting a message containing a list
of revoked key identifiers. Since the signature key is distributed
to the network using unicasting, the EsRev scheme may cause
heavy traffic in large scale sensor networks. Note that since
there is no need for the unicasting and the session key can be
updated in one round using broadcasting, the KeyRev scheme
performs much better than the EsRev scheme.
Although the GPSRRev scheme performs better than the
EsRev scheme by dividing the revocation field into sub-areas
and using multiple revocation messages, the multicast of the
revocation message in the sub-area is still time and energy
consuming. The KeyRev scheme is more efficient than the
GPSRRev scheme since it uses broadcast instead of multicast.
The distributed key revocation scheme, DistRev, has been
regarded to be faster than the centralized key revocation
schemes due to the fact that it requires only broadcast messages of a few hops that reach the local destinations [6].

However, in case a sensor node is compromised and revoked
successfully from the network, the DistRev scheme requires
four rounds of communications as follows (from [6]):
1) Neighboring nodes exchange the masks to decrypt the
votes for the current revocation sessions at the connection time.
2) At least t sensor nodes cast their votes against the target
node (compromised node) in the current session.
3) The voting nodes also cast their votes against the target
node on the next session.
4) If a sensor node receives at least t revocation votes,
a hash value containing the compromised sensor node
information needs to be broadcasted through the entire
network.
Although the first three rounds of the communications are
local broadcast, the last one involves a broadcast through the
entire network. The broadcast message can either be flooded
from the sensor node which receives t revocation votes or be
forwarded to the base station and broadcasted to the network
by the base station. Either way, the KeyRev scheme is much
better than the DistRev scheme since it requires only one
broadcast and no local communication is required. Further, the
DistRev scheme is also built on some simplifying assumptions,
for example, each node knows its neighboring nodes before
deployment, which are hard to satisfy in many sensor network
applications.
Table I compares the four revocation schemes discussed
in the paper, where n is the number of sensor nodes in
the network, d is the number of sub-areas in the GPSRRev
scheme, and t is the number of votes which a sensor node
has to collect to revoke a compromised node in the DistRev
scheme. We consider the situation when a single node is
compromised and revoked successfully from the network.
TABLE I
C OMPARISON OF THE KEY REVOCATION SCHEMES IN WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS .
Scheme

I
II

EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev
DistRev

Rnds

Unicast

Broadcast

2
1
1
4

n
d
0
0

1
0
1
1

Local
Broadcast
0
d
0
2∗t

Scalability
Low
Medium
Good
Good

Category I denotes centralized key revocation schemes and category
II denotes distributed key revocation schemes. The GPSRRev scheme
requires the location information of the compromised sensor nodes.

The comparison in Table I shows that the KeyRev scheme
is better than other schemes in reducing the communication
overhead caused by the revocation protocol. Notice that the
KeyRev scheme requires a session key to be distributed to
the network during each session. The duration of the session
time could be set and adjusted dynamically according to the
application to reduce the background traffic in the sensor
network.
2) Secure group communication: In [16], we proposed two
secure group communication schemes, SGC-unicasting and

SGC-broadcasting for wireless sensor networks. In this paper,
we further present two secure group communication schemes,
SGC-overlapping and SGC-preloading for wireless sensor networks. The communication overhead of the proposed schemes
is compared in Table II.
Since the SGC-unicasting scheme depends on a key tree
to distribute the group key, the scheme must maintain the
integrity of the key tree when sensors join or leave the group.
With the SGC-broadcasting, the SGC-overlapping and the
SGC-preloading schemes, the distribution of the group key
does not depend on the key tree. Thus, it is more easier to
handle the join and the leave operations.
V. S IMULATION E XPERIMENTS AND R ESULTS
We consider two sensor network experimental settings: a
small-scale sensor network with 100 nodes uniformly dispersed in a field with dimension 100m × 100m and a largescale sensor network with 1000 nodes uniformly dispersed in
a field with dimension 2000m × 2000m. In both the networks,
we set the base station at the center of the field and we assume
that all the sensor nodes are within reach of the base station.
A. KeyRev scheme
We compare the KeyRev scheme with the centralized key
revocation schemes, the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev
scheme, and the distributed key revocation scheme, the DistRev scheme. The evaluation metrics include the key revocation time tv and the average energy consumption ev per
node to revoke a compromised sensor in the network. The
key revocation time is the time duration from when the key
revocation protocol starts until all the uncompromised sensor
nodes receive the key revocation message.
Table III shows the key revocation time to revoke a compromised sensor node in the two networks. As the table shows, in
the 100-node sensor network, the key revocation times using
the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are about 83
times and 1.6 times that of the KeyRev scheme. In the 1000node sensor network, the key revocation times using the EsRev
scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are 800 times and 6.5 times
that of the KeyRev scheme. The KeyRev scheme is much
better than the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme in
terms of the key revocation time.
Table IV shows the average energy consumption to revoke
a compromised sensor in the 100-node and 1000-node sensor
networks. As the table shows, in the 100-node sensor network,
the average energy consumption to revoke a single node using
the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev are about 71 times and
19 times that of the KeyRev scheme. In the 1000-node sensor
network, the average energy consumption to revoke a single
sensor using the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are
about 714 times and 29 times that of the KeyRev scheme. The
KeyRev scheme is much better than the EsRev scheme and the
GPSRRev scheme in terms of the average energy consumption.
In both the experimental settings, the KeyRev scheme
performs very well compared with the EsRev scheme and the
GPSRRev scheme. Further, Tables III and IV also show that

TABLE II
C OMPARISON .

Group formation
Group key update

SGC-unicasting
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
1
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
0
n/a

message
unicast
broadcast
unicast
broadcast

SGC-broadcasting
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
2
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

the key revocation time and the average energy consumption to
revoke a single sensor node by using the KeyRev scheme have
only a slight difference between the 100-node sensor network
and the 1000-node sensor network, which indicates that the
KeyRev scheme is scalable to large-scale sensor networks.
However, due to the long key revocation delay caused by the
EsRev scheme, the EsRev scheme is not scalable to large-scale
sensor networks. The performance of the GPSRRev scheme is
better than the EsRev scheme but not as good as that of the
KeyRev scheme.
TABLE III
K EY REVOCATION TIME .

Scheme
EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev

100-node WSN
Time (seconds)
49.63
1.02
0.59

1000-node WSN
Time (seconds)
496.06
4.04
0.62

TABLE IV
AVERAGE ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER NODE TO REVOKE A
COMPROMISED SENSOR .

Scheme
EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev

100-node WSN
Energy (joules)
0.71
0.19
0.01

1000-node WSN
Energy (joules)
7.14
0.29
0.01

To evaluate the performance of the KeyRev scheme, we also
compare the KeyRev scheme with the DistRev scheme. The
metrics we evaluate include the key revocation time and the
average energy consumption. Each revocation session in the
DistRev scheme consists of three states: pending, active, and
completed. The critical part of the three states which decides
the key revocation time is the active state. In the active state,
a sensor node casts a vote and the vote is broadcasted locally
among the neighboring nodes. Assume that the active state
lasts for ∆s time for each node and ∆c is the maximum
time that a message needs to completely propagate in a local
neighborhood broadcast. We have tv > ∆s and ∆s > 2∆c
since each sensor has to vote both in the current session and
in the next session. Therefore, the key revocation time tv of
the DistRev scheme is at least twice that of ∆c , thus tv > 2∆c .
Similarly, let e∆s be the energy consumption during the active
state and e∆c be the energy consumption consumed during the
∆c period of time, We have ev > e∆s , e∆s > te∆c (to revoke
a compromised sensor node, the sensor node must receive at
least t revocation votes) and thus, ev > te∆c .
The duration of ∆c is decided by a maximum count L (maxhops) which the vote can be broadcasted to ensure complete

SGC-overlapping
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
2
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

SGC-preloading
nums
size
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

dissemination in the neighborhood of a compromised sensor
node (four-six hops can cover this area with high probability
[2]). We test the ∆c in the 100-node and the 1000-node sensor
networks. The sensor node casting the vote is set to the center
of each testbed. Table V shows the number of sensor nodes
in the coverage area when the max-hops changes.
TABLE V
T HE NUMBER OF NODES IN THE COVERED AREA .
L (max-hops)
100-node WSN
1000-node WSN

1
100
15

2
n/a
44

3
n/a
85

4
n/a
142

5
n/a
219

6
n/a
299

Note: All the sensor nodes in the 100-node sensor network
are in the cover area when the max-hops is set to 1.

In the 100-node sensor network, the simulation results show
that ∆c = 0.035 seconds and e∆c = 995 nano-joules. Thus,
we have tv > 0.070 and ev > 995t nano-joules. Compared
with the KeyRev scheme in the 100-node sensor network as
shown in Tables III and IV, the DistRev scheme might be
better than the KeyRev scheme but the performance of the
KeyRev scheme is also very good in the 100-node sensor
network.
Figure 1 shows the key revocation time of the DistRev
scheme in the 1000-node sensor network when the maxhops changes. Note that the column value is not the real key
revocation time tv of the DistRev scheme but the value of
the 2∆c . The actual key revocation time is tv > 2∆c . The
dotted horizontal line shows the key revocation time of the
KeyRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network. From the
figure, we can draw the conclusion that the KeyRev scheme is
better than the DistRev scheme in terms of the key revocation
time since the max-hops is definitely greater than one in the
DistRev scheme to ensure full coverage of the neighboring
nodes of the target node (compromised node).
Figure 2 shows the average energy consumption per node
in the DistRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network when
the max-hops changes. The column value is also not the real
average energy consumption ev of the DistRev scheme but the
value of 2e∆c (we set t to the minimum value 2, t = 2). The
actual average energy consumption is ev > te∆c . The dotted
horizontal line shows the average energy consumption of the
KeyRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network. The figure
indicates that the KeyRev scheme is better than the DistRev
scheme even if we set the number of votes to revoke a sensor
node to the minimum value of two.
To ensure that the neighborhood of the target node (compromised node) is fully covered, the max-hops cannot be set too
small. Thus, our proposed scheme, KeyRev, is better than the

Fig. 1. Key revocation time in the 1000-node sensor network. The column
value is not the real key revocation time tv of the DistRev scheme but the
value of the 2∆c .

Fig. 2. Average energy consumption per node to revoke a compromised
sensor in the 1000-node sensor network. The column value is also not the
real average energy consumption ev of the DistRev scheme but the value of
2e∆c .

DistRev scheme. From Figures 1 and 2, we can estimate the
performance of the KeyRev scheme and the DistRev scheme.
For example, if the max-hops is set to five, the key revocation
time of the DistRev scheme is at least 10.1 times that of
the KeyRev scheme and the average energy consumption of
the DistRev scheme is at least 6.8 times that of the KeyRev
scheme.
Overall, the KeyRev scheme is much better than the previously proposed centralized key revocation schemes, such as the
EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme. It is also superior
to the distributed key revocation scheme, the DistRev scheme.
B. Secure group communication schemes
We compare the two new SGC schemes (SGC-overlapping
and SGC-preloading) with the schemes (SGC-unicasting and
SGC-broadcasting) proposed in [16]. We test the four schemes
for different group sizes. The group size is decided by a
maximum count (max-hops) along the routes in which the
interest message is forwarded and we assume that all sensor
nodes which hear the message become group members. For
each group size, we run the simulation ten times and the
average value is measured. Table VI shows the group size and
the max-hops in our simulation. The same group of sensor
nodes is used for all the four schemes in each test scenario.
TABLE VI
G ROUP SIZE AND THE MAX - HOPS IN THE SIMULATION .
L (max-hops)
Group size

1
16

2
38

3
70

4
126

5
206

6
284

7
389

8
503

Table VII shows the group formation time as the value
of max-hops increases. It shows that the SGC-broadcasting
and the SGC-overlapping schemes require more time to set

up the group than the SGC-unicasting scheme. Although the
group formation phase is similar in the SGC-unicasting and
the SGC-overlapping schemes, the SGC-overlapping scheme
takes longer because the whole sensor network is involved
in the group formation phase. Due to the transmission of
additional key materials in the SGC-broadcasting scheme, the
scheme needs more time than the SGC-unicasting scheme
to set up the group. The SGC-broadcasting scheme is even
worse than the SGC-overlapping scheme when the max-hops
is greater than eight. By preloading a group key share in
sensor nodes, the SGC-preloading scheme can greatly reduce
the group formation time. The group formation time in the
SGC-preloading scheme is equal to the broadcast message
transmission time in the network. Further, we notice that it
takes a long time (> 1min) for the SGC-unicasting, the SGCbroadcasting, and the SGC overlapping schemes to initialize
the group when the value of max-hops is greater than three.
It indicates that the value of max-hops on routes along which
the interest messages are allowed to traverse should be less
than four. Table VIII shows the group key update time in the
group maintenance phase. By using broadcasting instead of
unicasting to distribute the group key, the SGC-broadcasting,
the SGC-overlapping, and the SGC-preloading schemes are
much better than the SGC-unicasting scheme. The SGCoverlapping and the SGC-preloading schemes use the same
group key update process and thus have the same group key
update time. The SGC-broadcasting scheme consumes more
energy than the SGC-overlapping and the SGC-preloading
schemes because it requires more communication rounds (L)
to flood the message.
Figure 3 shows the average group controller energy consumption in the group formation and the group key update
phrases. Since the base station takes the role of the group
controller in the SGC-overlapping and the SGC-preloading
schemes, the energy consumption of the SGC-overlapping
scheme and the SGC-preloading scheme is not shown in the
figures. As the figures indicate, although the SGC-unicasting
scheme requires less energy for the group controller to set up
the group, the group controller in the SGC-unicasting scheme
consumes much more energy to update the group key. Because
the group key is updated at regular time intervals, the SGCunicasting scheme may cause the group controller to deplete
its energy much faster than the SGC-broadcasting scheme.
Tables IX and X show the average group member energy
consumption in the group formation and group key update
phases. As the tables show, the SGC-unicasting scheme is
slightly better than other schemes in the group formation phase
but the SGC-unicasting scheme costs much more energy in
the group key update phase. Due to the preloading of the
group key share in sensor nodes, the SGC-preloading scheme
performs the best in both the group formation and the group
key update phases.
Figure 4 shows the energy distribution among group members when the value of max-hops is three. As the figures
show, the SGC-unicasting scheme may cause the energy to be
distributed unevenly in the group formation phase. However,

TABLE VII
G ROUP FORMATION TIME ( SECONDS ). B Y PRELOADING A GROUP KEY SHARE IN SENOR NODES ,
THE GROUP FORMATION TIME .
L (max-hops)
SGC-unicasting
SGC-broadcasting
SGC-overlapping
SGC-preloading

1
10.15
10.94
29.83
0.62

2
26.71
28.35
46.30
0.62

3
39.92
42.53
61.06
0.62

4
73.13
75.98
85.48
0.62

5
112.27
115.96
128.87
0.62

THE

6
158.40
162.82
174.93
0.62

SGC- PRELOADING SCHEME GREATLY REDUCES

7
203.79
208.82
233.22
0.62

8
272.61
278.27
277.13
0.62

TABLE VIII
G ROUP KEY UPDATE TIME ( SECONDS ). T HE SGC- OVERLAPPING SCHEME AND THE SGC- PRELOADING SCHEME ARE MUCH BETTER WHEN UPDATING
THE GROUP KEY.
L (max-hops)
SGC-unicasting
SGC-broadcasting
SGC-overlapping
SGC-preloading

1
8.10
0.61
0.62
0.62

2
19.81
1.58
0.62
0.62

3
37.35
2.17
0.62
0.62

4
63.88
3.19
0.62
0.62

5
107.25
3.55
0.62
0.62

TABLE IX
AVERAGE GROUP MEMBER ENERGY CONSUMPTION (J OULES ):
L (max-hops)
SGC-unicasting
SGC-broadcasting
SGC-overlapping
SGC-preloading

1
0.15
0.16
0.42
0.01

2
0.39
0.41
0.66
0.01

3
0.58
0.62
0.86
0.01

4
1.06
1.10
1.23
0.01

5
1.63
1.68
1.85
0.01

TABLE X
AVERAGE GROUP MEMBER ENERGY CONSUMPTION (J OULES ):
L (max-hops)
SGC-unicasting
SGC-broadcasting
SGC-overlapping
SGC-preloading

1
0.12
0.01
0.01
0.01

2
0.29
0.02
0.01
0.01

3
0.54
0.03
0.01
0.01

the energy is distributed more evenly in the SGC-broadcasting
and the SGC-overlapping schemes in both the group formation
and group update phases. The SGC-preloading scheme has no
such issues due to the use of broadcasting messages.
To summarize, with respect to the group formation time
and the energy consumption in the group controller and the
group member sensor nodes, the SGC-unicasting scheme is
slightly better than the other schemes in the group formation
phase; however, the SGC-broadcasting, the SGC-overlapping,
and the SGC-preloading schemes are far better than the SGCunicasting scheme in the group key update phase. In the
simulation, we use a simple flooding protocol to set up the
route path in the SGC-overlapping scheme. Considering that
the routing paths might be set up before the group formation
phase and the setup of the routing paths can also benefit
the data acquisition in the network, the SGC-overlapping
scheme is a better solution for secure group communication
in sensor networks. As the simulation results show, if we can
group the sensor nodes together before the sensor network is
deployed, the SGC-preloading scheme is the best solution for
secure group communication in sensor networks. Note that the
performance of the SGC-unicasting scheme represents that of
a general category of secure group communication schemes

4
0.92
0.05
0.01
0.01

5
1.55
0.05
0.01
0.01

6
144.27
4.05
0.62
0.62

7
197.55
4.69
0.62
0.62

8
253.99
5.36
0.62
0.62

GROUP FORMATION PHASE .

6
2.29
2.36
2.52
0.01

7
2.95
3.02
2.35
0.01

8
3.94
4.02
4.00
0.01

GROUP KEY UPDATE PHASE .

6
2.08
0.06
0.01
0.01

7
2.85
0.07
0.01
0.01

8
3.67
0.08
0.01
0.01

using a key tree structure.
VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
In this paper, we propose a key management framework,
uKeying, for wireless sensor networks utilizing a globally
distributed session key. uKeying does not depend on a specific
key distribution scheme and can be extended to support other
key distribution schemes. The proposed framework utilizes the
efficient key revocation scheme, KeyRev, to remove compromised sensor nodes. As we show in the paper, the KeyRev
scheme is much better than other centralized key revocation
schemes and even better than the distributed key revocation
schemes. We further demonstrate how to use the framework
to support secure group communication protocols in wireless
sensor networks.
uKeying depends on a globally distributed session key
in the network, which requires that the sensor network be
synchronized. Since most broadcast authentication schemes,
such as µT esla, require the synchronization of all sensor
nodes in the network, it is not a problem if such broadcast
authentication schemes are used. Our future work will extend
the framework to scenarios where the sensor network is not
synchronized.

(a) Group formation phase.

(b) Group key update phase.

Fig. 3. Average group controller energy consumption (Joules). The SGC-unicasting scheme requires less energy for the group controller to set up the group,
however, the group controller in the SGC-unicasting scheme consumes much more energy to update the group key.

(a) SGC-unicasting

(b) SGC-broadcasting

(c) SGC-overlapping

Fig. 4. Average group member energy distribution by hops (Joules). The SGC-unicasting scheme may cause the energy to be distributed unevenly in the
group formation phase.

R EFERENCES
[1] Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, “A survey of security
issues in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys and
Tutorials, vol. 8, no. 2, 2006.
[2] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme for
distributed sensor networks,” in CCS ’02: Proceedings of the 9th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security. New York, NY,
USA: ACM Press, 2002, pp. 41–47.
[3] R. D. Pietro, L. V. Mancini, Y. W. Law, S. Etalle, and P. J. M.
Havinga, “LKHW: A directed Diffusion-Based secure multicast scheme
for wireless sensor networks,” in ICPPW ’03: Proceedings of the 32nd
International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops.
IEEE
Computer Society Press, 2003, pp. 397–406.
[4] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, S. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “A key
management scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment
knowledge,” in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2004, pp. 586–597.
[5] Y. Wang, B. Ramamurthy, and X. Zou, “KeyRev: An efficient key revocation scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in ICC ’07: Proceedings of
IEEE International Conference on Communications, Glasgow, Scotland,
U.K., June 2007.
[6] H. Chan, V. Gligor, A. Perrig, and G. Muralidharan, “On the distribution and revocation of cryptographic keys in sensor networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.
233–247, July-Sept. 2005.
[7] S. A. Cametepe and B. Yener, “Combinatorial design of key distribution
mechanisms for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of 9th European Symposium on Research Computer Security, Sophia Antipolis,
France, 2004.
[8] J. Lee and D. R. Stinson, “Deterministic key predistribution schemes
for distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of Selected Areas in
Cryptography, 2004, pp. 294–307.
[9] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, May 2003.
[10] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “LEAP: efficient security mechanisms
for large-scale distributed sensor networks,” in CCS ’03: Proceedings of

[11]

[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2003, pp. 62–72.
S. Zhu, S. Setia, S. Jajodia, and P. Ning, “An interleaved hop-byhop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data in sensor
networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
Oakland, CA, USA, May 2004, pp. 259–271.
F. Ye, H. Luo, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Statistical en-route filtering
of injected false data in sensor networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE
INFOCOM, 2004.
G. Wang, W. Zhang, C. Cao, and T. L. Porta, “On supporting distributed
collaboration in sensor networks,” in Proceedings of MILCOM, 2003.
W. Zhang, H. Song, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, “Least privilege and privilege
deprivation: towards tolerating mobile sink compromises in wireless
sensor networks,” in MobiHoc ’05: Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing.
New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2005, pp. 378–389.
B. Karp and H. T. Kung, “GPSR: greedy perimeter stateless routing
for wireless networks,” in MobiCom ’00: Proceedings of the 6th annual
international conference on Mobile computing and networking. New
York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2000, pp. 243–254.
Y. Wang and B. Ramamurthy, “Group rekeying schemes for secure group
communication in wireless sensor networks,” in ICC ’07: Proceedings of
IEEE International Conference on Communications, Glasgow, Scotland,
U.K., June 2007.
J.-H. Huang, J. Buckingham, and R. Han, “A level key infrastructure for
secure and efficient group communication in wireless sensor network,” in
SECURECOMM ’05: Proceedings of the First International Conference
on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SECURECOMM’05). Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer
Society, 2005, pp. 249–260.
D. Liu, P. Ning, and K. Sun, “Efficient self-healing group key distribution with revocation capability,” in CCS ’03: Proceedings of the 10th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security. New
York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2003, pp. 231–240.
A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar, “SPINS:
Security protocols for sensor networks,” Wireless Networks, vol. 8, no. 5,
pp. 521–534, September 2002.

